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RECENT CASES
not be found, it hardly seems that this should also be true if the change occurs after a
dispute arises. If such were the case, an employer could terminate the basis of a labor
dispute at his discretion, as the court intimates, without complying with any of the
union's demands.
Although, after the dispute arises, the union employee fails to pay dues or actively
participate through the union, according to the second Ostroff case he will still be con-
sidered a member of the union, so long as he has not attempted to withdraw from the
union. There the union employee had discontinued any active employment through the
union and had taken up employment in another field of work.
One final question is raised by the second Ostroff case with regard to the possible
termination of a labor dispute. 'In that case, since the only union employee h-:A left
P's employment, it seems that if the union had ended its controversy with P, it would
not be able to resume picketing at a later date unless the basis for a labor dispute could
be found, i.e., unless one of its members had been hired by P or unless one of P's
employees had joined the union. The question is then, how far may a union go in chang-
ing or altering its demands before the original controversy will be considered at an
end? In the, first Ostroff case, the court seemed to invite the change in demands and
this was done all to the satisfaction of the court in the second Ostroff case. Assuming
that the changes affected all of the union demands and all new demands were subse-
quently made, would not the time for determining the labor dispute then be at the time
the new demands were made rather than at the time of the original demands? If the
changes made in the demands did not completely replace the old demands, when will the
court consider the time for determining the basis of a labor dispute to have shifted from
the original time to the time the new demands are made?
' As may be seen from the cases here presented, there are a number of questions that
the court, or the legisIature if it chooses, may answer for us at a future date. The rule
that peaceful picketing will not be enjoined if a labor dispute exists and the objectives
are not unlawful seems fairly stable and not likely to be changed except by statute.'
From the list of objectives that have been declared unlawful and the ones that have,
been held lawful, the union and the employer have a fair idea of'how their relations
should be guided. Similarly, there seems to bd a fair criterion for establishing when
a person is an employee. But much speculation begins to arise in the inception and
termination of that status. Also, it is not clear how changes in demands will affect the
existence of a labor dispute if all of the union employees had left their employment
after the dispute arose. Clarification of these matters will probably await case-by-case
determination in the courts, but a replacement or remodeling of the twenty-year-old
labor disputes act, RCW 49.32.010 et seq. [RRS § 7612 et seq.], would be a great con-
tribution to clarification of the labor picture in Washiigton.
ROBERT S. "MJCKLESTONE
Evidence-Admissibility of Related Offenses. D was charged with sodomy and rape.
A confession of a prior similar assault and attempted rape was admitted with the
instruction that the confession should be used only for whatever bearing it might have
upon common scheme or plan in connection with the rape charges. D was acquitted of
rape and convicted of sodomy. Appeal. Held: Affirmed. Evidence of other crimes may
not be admitted unless the evidence is relevant and necessary to prove an essential
ingredient of the crime charged. This confession was not sufficiently related to show
w common scheme 'or plan. However, D was not prejudiced as to the rape charges
because he was acquitted of rape, nor did the evidence prejudice him on the sodomy
counts because the confession could have been properly admitted to establish identity
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and to prove that the acts charged could be committed in the cab of the truck. State v.
Goebel, 40 Wn. 2d 18, 240 P. 2d 251 (1952).
In this case D's method was to strike up a conversation by claiming to have seen
the woman on his bus route. He would then offer to take her home in his truck, drive
to a secluded spot and attempt rape. The general rule, and that of Washington, is that
evidence of similar offenses is not admissible to show evil propensities or that the
defendant has a tendency to commit the crime with which he is charged. State v.
Barton, 198 Wash. 268, 88 P. 2d 385 (1939) ; Neff v. United States, 105 F. 2d 688
(C.A. 8th 1939) ; State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 289 (1876). The similarities in the Goebel
case go somewhat beyond showing a criminal disposition and tend to establish a
genc-l plan of operation on rapes of this sort even if they do not point to any particu-
lar act. However, in excluding the evidence from the common plan or scheme theory
the court said the strict scope of that theory was limited to evidence which shows some
causal connection between the offenses and which establishes a pre-existing design
directed toward the doing of the very act charged. Actually, the value of the inference
from the single prior act to the probability that D did the acts in the manner charged
is rather insignificant if the improper consideration that D is an evil man could be
completely isolated from it. This limited relevancy must be weighed against the great
damage that the evidence did to D's case by displaying his character. The opinion cites
the rule established in an earlier appeal of the same case that evidence of other offenses
even if relevant should not be admitted if its effect would be to "generate more heat
than light." State v. Goebel, 36 Wn. 2d 367, 218 P. 2d 300 (1950).
Some cases declare that similar offense evidence is admissible if it is relevant to
any necessary element of the crime. People v. Williams, 6 Cal. 2d 500, 58 P. 2d 917
(1936) ; Parris v. People, 129 Ill. 521, 21 N.E. 821 (1889) ; State v. Simpson, 50 N.W.
2d 601 (Iowa 1951). Others hold that only evidence offered to prove motive, intent,
absence of mistake or accident, common plan or scheme, or identity is excepted from a
general rule that evidence of crimes not charged is inadmissible. People v. Molineux,
168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901) ; Hancock v. State, 123 Tex. Cr. 154, 58 S.W. 2d
129 (1933) ; Parkinson v. People, 135 Ill. 401, 25 N.E. 764 (1890) ; State v. Lyle, 125
S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923). Others add further exceptions. Weldon v. State, 84 Ga.
App. 634, 66 S.E. 2d 920 (1951) (guilty knowledge) ; Leezer v. State, 121 Tex. Cr.
128, 51 S.W. 2d 606 (1932) (res gestae). Some further limit the exceptions. Helton v.
Commonwealth, 244 S.W. 2d 762 (Ky. 1951) ; People v. De Garmo, 179 N.Y. 130,
71 N.E. 736 (1904). The creation of such a rule of general exclusion subject to limited
exceptions has resulted in some confusion and perversion of justice because (1) over-
whelmingly relevant evidence is rejected if not within one of the categories; (2) the
attempts to force evidence of other offenses into the prescribed categories frequently
result in distorting the exception so as to leave it very indefinite; (3) the true test of
relevancy is obscured and sometimes ignored in the attempt to determine if one of the
ready made exceptions is applicable. See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact
Evidence; America, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 988 (1938).
The Washington court has before avoided these difficulties by recognizing that the
common exceptions to the rule that other offenses should be excluded are not the only
ones. The real test is relevancy. State v. Lew, 26 Wn. 2d 394, 174 P. 2d 291 (1946) ;
State v. Davis, 6 Wn. 2d 696, 108 P. 2d 641 (1940); State v. O'Donnell, 195 Wash.
471, 81 P. 2d 509 (1938). But intermingled among numerous decisions so stating are
cases which tacitly imply that only evidence offered to prove identity, common plan or
scheme, guilty knowledge, motive or intent will be admitted. State v. Salle, 34 Wn. 2d
183, 208 P. 2d 872 (1949) ; State v. Kritzer, 21 Wn. 2d 710, 152 P. 2d 967 (1944);
State v. Barton, 198 Wash. 268, 88 P. 2d 385 (1939).
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The net result in Washington is that a trial judge is not always sure what standard
he must apply. The safest solution appears to be that this evasive class of evidence
must be pigeon-Joled in battered compartments -if at all possible. Consequently, tor-
tured instructions follow. For example, in State v. Shay, 186 Wash. 134, 57 P. 2d 401
(1936) the defendant was convicted of grafting by attempting to bribe jurors and prior
similar acts were shown. The only instruction as to the use of the evidence was, "This
evidence is admitted only to be considered by you insofar as it may throw light upon
the transaction ... alleged in the information, by showing scheme or iystem or guilty
knowledge." (Brief for Appellant, p. 109). How far does such an instruction go in
preventing improper use of the evidence? Scheme or system is an element of no crime
but only a medium through which an inference may be made that a necessary element is
present. Then the supreme court is forced to decide not only whether the evidence was
relevant enough to be admitted but also whether the instructed use was proper. These
problems will be less frequent if the Washington Supreme Court is taken at its word in
the Goebel case when it says that the five common exception; are not exhaustive, and,
that the true test. is relevancy to the issues.
DALE RIVELAND
Guardian Ad Litem-Right of Alleged Incompetent to Contest Appointment. In an
action brought by ;n ex-husband tb enjoin an ex-wife's privilege of visiting their
children, the trial court on the motion and evidence of incompetency offered by P
appointed a guardian ad litem for D. The appointment was resisted by D. On- appli-
cation for a writ of prohibition to prevent appointment of guardian ad litem, 'Held:.
D is entitled to a full and fair hearing and an opportunity to defend against the
appointment of a guardian ad litem. Graham v. Graham, 40 Wn. 2d 64, 240 P. 2d 564
(1952).
Although there have been seventeen reported cases concerning guardians ad litein
in Washington, this is the first case involving an objection to the appointment. The
point rarely arises because the normal situation concerns either a minor or a person
admittedly insane or incompetent. It is the purpose of this note to analyze the Wash-
ington cases and show their relation to the principal case.
The first group of Washington'cases poses the problem of when failure to appoint
a guardian ad litem constitutes reversible error. The purposes of such guardian is to
protect the interests of a party to an action when, in the 'opinion of the court, that party
is incapable 'of so doing himself. A minor is legally presumed to lack the capacity to
look after his own interests. Therefore the statutory provision for the appointment of
a guardian ad litem is mandatory, and any adjudication adverse to the interests of such
unrepresented minor is reversible error. Kongsbach v. Casey,. 66 Wash. 643, 120 Pac.
108 (1912); Mezere v. Flory, 26 Wn. 2d 274, 173 P. 2d 776 (1946). The failiure to
appoint a guardian ad litem is not reversible error if the minor party was successful,
and the adverse party did not object until after the pleading on the merits. Blumauer
v. Clock, 24 Wash. 596, 64 Pac. 844 (1901) ; see also Hale v. Crown Columbia Pulp
and Paper Co., 56 Wash. 236, 105 Pac. 480 (1909). Reversal wili also result if an
adjudication is obtained against one non compos mentis by default when such party is
known to be incompetent and is not represented by a guardian ad litem. Townsend v.
Price, 19 Wash. 415, 53 Pac. 668 (1898). However a failure to appoint a guardian
ad litem where an insane person is represented by a general guardian who actively
defends in the action will not affect the award. In re DeNisson, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P.
2d 1024 (1938).
A second group of cases involves the issue of the propriety of appointing a guardian
ad litem when the party is already under the control of a general guardian. The prob-
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